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Abstract: Recent research finds that markups are rising, suggesting declining competition. 
But does less price competition mean less Schumpeterian “creative destruction”/industry 
dynamism? This paper reports the first recent estimates of trends in the displacement of 
industry-leading firms. Displacement hazards rose for several decades since 1970 but have 
declined sharply since 2000. Using a production function-based model to explore the role of 
investments, acquisitions, and lobbying, we find that investments by dominant firms in 
intangibles, especially software, are distinctly associated with greater persistence and reduced 
leapfrogging. Software investments by top firms soared around 2000, contributing 
substantially to the decline. Also, higher markups are associated with greater displacement 
hazards, linking rents positively with industry dynamism. While technology is often seen as 
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Introduction 
Studies find evidence of rising firm markups and profit shares1 and of rising industry 
concentration at the national level.2 Many economists and policymakers are concerned about 
declining competition in the US and in other developed economies. Generally, declining 
competition is troubling for two very different reasons, one static and the other dynamic: 1) 
without sufficient competition, firms acquire market power allowing them to raise prices and 
lower output, creating allocative inefficiencies,3 and, 2) low competition may reflect barriers 
that block firms with innovative new technologies from entering, growing, and replacing 
firms that use older, less productive technologies; the result is a decline in industrial 
dynamism and productivity growth. Economists have suggested that declining competition is 
related to declining firm startup rates, slower labor reallocation to more productive firms, 
and declining investment (see for example Furman 2016, Crouzet and Eberly 2018). 
However, there is considerable tension between the notion of static price 
competition and Schumpeterian technological competition. While markups measure price 
competition by quantifying the deviation of prices from marginal cost, markups may be 
orthogonal to technological competition. Firms with innovative new technologies may earn 
rents, allowing them to charge higher markups. For instance, Bessen (2020) and Criscuolo et 
al. (2018) find positive links between information technology (IT) investments and markups 
or profit margins.  
 
1 De Loecker and Eeckhout, and Unger (2020), Barkai (2017), Hall (2018), Baqaee and Fahri (2017); see Basu 
(2019) and Syverson (2019) for reviews. 
2 Grullon et al. (2019), Autor et al. (2020), Gutierrez and Philippon (2017, 2019), Bessen (2020) but also see 
Rinz (2018), Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019), and Berry et al. (2019). 
3 Including, possibly, monopsony power in labor markets. 
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A complete understanding of competition requires additional metrics. This paper 
measures Schumpeterian competition, explores how it has changed over recent decades, and 
identifies what appear to be the main barriers to Schumpeterian competition. We also look at 
the relationship between Schumpeterian competition and other measures of competition, 
specifically markups and industry concentration. 
We use two main measures of Schumpeterian “creative destruction”: 1) the annual 
displacement hazard that a firm ranked top four by sales in its industry falls out of the top 
four, and, 2) the annual hazard that a firm ranked fifth through eighth leapfrogs into the top 
four. We model these probabilities using a simple extension of a standard production 
function. We assume that firms optimize variable inputs so that each firm’s revenues are a 
reduced-form function of the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity, the firm’s capital, and—
because of strategic interaction—capital stocks of rival firms. Then, under some simple 
assumptions, displacement and leapfrogging probabilities can be expressed as functions of 
firm productivity and firm investments, including those of rivals. This allows us to use 
regression analysis to explore the extent to which different kinds of capital affect the hazard 
rates and can account for the observed trends. We consider a variety of capital stocks 
including physical capital, intangibles, R&D, patents, organizational capital, different types of 
software, advertising and marketing, lobbying, and acquisitions. 
Our first finding is that displacement and leapfrogging hazards exhibit a sharp break 
in trend: after rising robustly for many decades, they fell sharply starting around the year 
2000. To fix ideas, it is helpful to preview a result developed more completely below. Figure 
1 shows several annual measures of Schumpeterian turnover along with the best-fit linear 
trends with a single break, where the break years are determined by Wald supremum tests. 
Panels A, C, and D show displacement hazards; panel B shows a leapfrogging hazard. Below 
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we discuss the details of these measures and also a number of alternative metrics. The 
picture that emerges is this: turnover of market leaders rose substantially from 1970 through 
the 1990s, but around 2000 the turnover rates began dropping. The change was sharp and 
substantial and across most sectors, suggesting a major shift in the nature of Schumpeterian 
competition.  
Second, we explore the roles of different capital stocks in accounting for these shifts. 
We find that rising investments in intangibles generally and in software in particular can 
account for most of the drop in displacement and leapfrogging hazards since 2000. 
Intangible and software investments by top firms appear to impose a negative externality on 
second-tier firms, reducing their leapfrogging probabilities. Dominant firms increased their 
investment in software by an order of magnitude around 2000. Even relative to second-tier 
firms ranked 5-8, the top four firms more than doubled their software stocks. Moreover, 
using Census microdata and BEA industry data, it appears that this relationship is largely 
driven by own account (self-developed) software, which is substantially dominated by large 
firms. An instrumental variable analysis provides some support for the idea that the impact 
of own-account software on displacement hazards may be causal. We discuss why software 
might be playing this role. 
We find little to support the view that declining competition has resulted from lax 
antitrust merger enforcement. Mergers and acquisitions by top firms do not significantly 
reduce displacement and acquisitions by top firms have been declining. Nor does lobbying 
appear to have much influence on the persistence of dominant firms. 
Finally, we look at the correlations between displacement hazards and industry 
markups and concentration. We find that industries with higher markups actually have 
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higher rates of displacement, implying that markups are not a reliable indicator of industry 
dynamism. Displacement hazards are negatively associated with industry concentration. 
This analysis provides a richer picture of the nature of competition, including 
different kinds of competition. And it highlights the possibility that software technology is 
playing a new and different economic role recently. This paper makes three major 
contributions. First, we report changes in the displacement hazard for top firms ranked by 
sales in industries over time, for the first time in the literature, finding a sharp reversal of 
trend around 2000.4 Second, we develop a model that includes strategic interaction and, 
using firm level data, we obtain estimates of the link between investments made by dominant 
firms and their risk of being leapfrogged, including the negative externalities these 
investments exert on other firms. Third, we explore the associations between displacement 
hazards of market leaders, their markups, and industry concentration.  
Literature 
Joseph Schumpeter (1942, p. 84) held that what matters in “capitalist reality” is 
innovation, both technological and organizational. Innovative firms can command a decisive 
cost or quality advantage that allows them to grow and to displace existing firms in a 
“perennial gale of creative destruction.” In dynamic industries, innovative firms will enter 
new markets and they will grow until they displace firms using inferior technologies or 
 
4 Autor et al. (2020, Figure A14), in a subsidiary analysis, report changes in the persistence of the top 500 firms 
in Compustat. McKinsey consultants have tabulated a “topple rate” for firms finding a rise up to 2002 
(Viguerie and Thompson 2005). Covarrubius et al. (2019) look at displacement of top firms ranked by profits 
or market value. While they find a similar drop in displacement hazards, their measures are noisier and less 
indicative of market dominance. For instance, Amazon long had a low profit ranking because it reinvested at a 
high level. In any case, we find that sales-based measures are more precise and show a larger and sharper break 
in trend. 
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business models. Substantial empirical evidence supports the proposition that greater 
contestability of sales encourages firms to improve efficiency and invest in R&D (Shapiro 
2012, but see also Gilbert 2006). Many economists see industrial dynamism as highly 
important for long term productivity growth—perhaps more important than static 
deadweight losses arising from insufficient price competition.  
Hence, it might be helpful to obtain direct measures of “creative destruction” and 
see how they have changed over time. There is a literature on the persistence of dominant 
firms that seeks to establish the degree of persistence of industry leadership and to identify 
correlated industry characteristics (Caves 1998; Davies and Geroski 1997; Doi 2001; Franko 
2003; Geroski and Toker 1996; Honjo et al. 2018; Kato and Honjo 2006, 2009; Sutton 2007). 
However, while this literature has looked at levels of displacement hazards it has not looked 
at time trends, as we do. Furthermore, while the literature explores correlated industry 
characteristics, we explore a range of firm level investments that might affect displacement 
hazards, including possible strategic interaction.  
The displacement of market leaders is, of course, not the only measure of industrial 
dynamism. Some papers have studied changes in firm entry rates (Hathaway and Litan 
2014a,b; Guzman and Stern 2016; Gutierrez and Philippon 2019) and others have studied 
the growth rates of productive firms (Decker et al. 2018). However, the displacement of 
incumbent market leaders by innovators is the “finish line” of Schumpeterian competition, 
making displacement hazards an important dimension of industrial dynamism. 
We can gain some insight as to what might be driving the sharp change in 
displacement hazards by looking at associated firm investments. In many models of 
industrial organization, firms can make investments to bolster their market shares. For 
example, in the classic Cournot model, firms invest in capacity. In endogenous sunk cost 
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models (Sutton 1991), firms improve the perceived quality of their products through 
investments in advertising or R&D. The persistence of dominance literature identifies 
several industry-level investments associated with persistence, including R&D and 
advertising (Geroski and Toker 1996). Using firm microdata, we can better identify the role 
of specific investments as barriers to mobility. This is particularly important because firms 
dramatically increased their investments in some forms of capital since the 1990s, notably 
intangibles and software.5 
Our analysis is related to a literature on the persistence of firm profits across all firms 
within each industry (see Bennett and Gartenberg 2016 for a recent review). Beginning with 
Mueller (1977), a substantial literature looks at the persistence of profits for all firms within 
industries. A few of these studies have looked at trends in persistence of profits over time. 
Examining US firms through the 1990s, Wiggins and Ruefli (2005) and Gschwandtner 
(2012) find a decline in persistence/increase in competition; McNamara et al. (2003) find no 
significant change. Looking beyond the 1990s, there is some evidence of a reversal. Bennett 
and Gartenberg (2016) find declining persistence of return on assets until about 2000 and 
rising persistence after that plus some evidence of a link to software. Bennett (2020), 
measuring production function autocorrelation finds decreasing persistence until around 
2000, a reversal, and then a subsequent decline. 
We begin by describing the diverse data sources we use. We then present alternative 
measures of trends in displacement and leapfrogging hazards, followed by analysis of the 
 
5 Byrne, Oliner, Sichel (2013); Corrado, Hulten, Sichel (2009); BEA, “National Income and Product Accounts,” 
Table 9.4u, Software Investment and Prices. 
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associations between these hazards and firm investments. We then explore the association 
between displacement hazards, firm markups, and industry concentration and then conclude. 
Data 
Datasets 
Our main dataset consists of Compustat firms traded in US currency with positive 
sales, including firms with headquarters outside the US. Because of data limitations (see 
below), we primarily use years 1976 – 2017. To identify industries in these data, we use the 
historical NAICS assignments made by Standard & Poors, projecting backwards for years 
before NAICS coverage. Because NAICS coding changes every five years, we map these 
NAICS codes to the 2012 version for continuity. Compustat primarily includes publicly 
listed firms and reported sales include all global operations.  
A second dataset is the National Establishment Time Series (NETS), a product of 
Walls & Associates, derived from the Dun & Bradstreet Marketing Information File. NETS 
consists of establishment-level longitudinal data covering, in principle, the universe of U.S. 
business establishments, private and public. We aggregated the establishments from 1990 – 
2014, assigning firms to 8-digit SIC codes based on the primary line of business. Robustness 
checks based on coarser industry categories did not find substantially different results.  
Each of these datasets has limitations. Compustat misses most private firms, 
however, the largest firms in most industries tend to be publicly listed, so displacement rates 
of top four firms should still be reasonably accurate.6 NETS is known to over-represent very 
 
6   Tracking the 100 largest firms in the NETS database each year from 1990 – 2014, 77% of the observations 
are publicly listed. 
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small firms, but that shortcoming should not affect our analyses on dominant firms that tend 
to be large (Barnatchez, Crane and Decker, 2017). 
We also use confidential microdata from the Annual Capital Expenditures Survey 
(ACES) of the US Census from 2002 – 2012. This survey provides data on capital spending 
for new and used structures and equipment by U.S. nonfarm businesses, most importantly, 
spending on three types of software: pre-packaged, custom (contract), and own-developed. 
These microdata aggregate sales and capital expenditures of US establishments to the firm 
level, assigning the firm to a 3 or 4-digit NAICS code based on the largest business line. 
Finally, we used industry level data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
that also includes measures of software investment by type. We supplement these data with 
measures of investment, including software investment, in EU countries from EU KLEMS. 
We use these latter data in an instrumental variable analysis. 
Variables 
Our basic measure of displacement hazard is the probability that a firm that was 
ranked among the top four firms in its industry by sales last year is ranked below the top 
four this year. While we test alternative definitions below and perform additional robustness 
checks, this basic measure excludes firms that are not included in the dataset for the current 
year but includes firms that change industries. 
We use a variety of capital stocks in our analysis. All are deflated and all are 
beginning-of-year stocks, that is, they are lags of the end-of-year stocks that are typically 
reported. For tangible capital, we use net property, plant, and equipment from firm balance 
sheets. Peters and Taylor (2017) have developed measures of intangible capital based on 
three components: knowledge capital derived from R&D spending, organizational capital 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682745
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derived from Sales, General, and Administrative expenditures, and balance sheet intangibles. 
These values are available from 1975 through 2016.7 
We also obtained data on other detailed intangible investments and computed capital 
stocks using the perpetual inventory method:  
• Data on advertising and marketing expenditures come from Compustat. 
Following Villalonga (2004), we calculate stocks using a 5% pre-sample 
growth rate and 45% depreciation rate. 
• Data on patents come from Autor et al. (forthcoming), who use a 15% 
depreciation rate to compute patent stocks and who matched the data to 
Compustat. 
• Data on lobbying expenditures since 1998 come from Center for Responsive 
Politics.8 We use a 6% pre-sample growth rate and a 25% depreciation rate. 
We matched these data to Compustat using the company name (the client 
parent entity).9 
 
We also wanted to measure investments that firms make in developing proprietary 
software for their internal use. To do this, we obtained LinkedIn resume data and identified 
1,791 job titles that pertained to software development jobs (see details in Bessen and Righi 
2019). We tabulated the number of these employees, adjusted the numbers to account for 
differences in LinkedIn coverage over time, and matched the firms to Compustat from 1990 
– 2012.10 We then constructed software stocks treating the employment of software 
 
7 Following Peters and Taylor’s advice we exclude firms with less than $5 million gross PPE in 1990 dollars, 
firms in finance or utility industries, and we trim the 1% tails in Tobin’s q. 
8 http://www.opensecrets.org/resources/create/data_doc.php accessed 2016. 
9 Of 19,359 entities (companies, unions, trade associations, other organizations), we matched 11% to 
Compustat firms; these firms accounted for 53% of all lobbying expenditures. 
10 The match covers firms that account for 68% of the employees in Compustat in 1990, rising to over 90% of 
the employees in 2012. To adjust for changes in coverage over time, we scaled the LinkedIn counts of software 
employees by the ratio of software employees to all employees in the Current Population Survey to the ratio of 
software employees to all employees in LinkedIn. 
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developers as an investment, using a 33% depreciation rate and an 8% pre-sample growth 
rate. 
We also evaluate acquisitions as a kind of investment. To the extent that acquisitions 
generate goodwill—that is, to the extent that acquirers pay more than the book value of 
assets of acquired firms—they show up as balance sheet intangibles in the Peters and Taylor 
accounting. While goodwill captures the values of acquisitions, we also wanted to count the 
number of acquisitions made by large firms because even small-value transactions might 
confer significant technological advantage to dominant firms. We obtained a list of mergers 
and acquisitions from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum database and matched these to 
Compustat.11 To create acquisition stocks, we accumulated the number of transactions 
assuming a 15% depreciation rate and 8% pre-sample growth rate. To check the robustness 
of this procedure, we also used simple lagged acquisition flows and obtained similar results. 
To compute firm productivity, we follow common practice (see Keller and Yeaple 
2009), imputing materials and value added for the productivity estimates as follows: materials 
is cost of goods sold plus sales, general, and administrative expense less depreciation less the 
wage bill. Where the wage bill is not reported, we impute it as firm employment times the 
industry mean wage taken from the BEA. Value added is revenues minus materials. 
Finally, we estimate firm markups using the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and 
Unger (2020) which is based on De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) (see Appendix). 
Summary statistics can be found in Appendix A1. 
 
11 These data primarily consist of announced transactions. Public companies are not required to announce all 
mergers and acquisitions; however, the list tends to include transactions that are materially significant or where 
the acquired company has customers or suppliers who need to be informed. In practice, the number of 
announced transactions far exceed the number of transactions reported to the FTC under the Hart-Scott-
Rodino reporting requirements. We matched CUSIPs in the SDC data to permnos in CRSP to gvkeys in 
Compustat producing over 100,000 matched transactions. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682745
 12 
Empirical Findings 
The persistence of dominance 
The literature cited above on the persistence of dominance measures persistence by 
the hazard that leading firms will lose their leadership positions. In this paper, we use large 
samples, we estimate changing trends in the hazard of changes in leadership, and we relate 
these to a variety of firm investments. 
Our baseline measure is the annual hazard that a firm that was in the top four firms 
in its primary industry (6-digit NAICS in Compustat) ranked by revenue last year is no 
longer in the top four firms this year (not counting firms that exit Compustat). This hazard is 
shown in Figure 1A.12 The line represents the best-fit linear trend with a single break where 
the break year is determined by the supremum Wald test. In this case, the estimated break 
year is 2000. Table 1, row 1, displays the resulting regression coefficients for the baseline 
trend and change in trend after the break year. That is, for break year 𝜏, we estimate the 
annual hazard over time t 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝛼 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛽 ∙ min[0, 𝑡 − 𝜏] + 𝐶 + 𝜖𝑡 . 
 
where C is a constant. The estimated coefficients for both the trend and the change in trend 
are substantial, the change is negative, and the coefficients are significant at the 1% level. 
The remaining panels of Figure 1 and the additional rows in Table 1 explore a variety 
of alternative measures, alternative industry definitions, and alternative datasets to test the 
 
12 Note that while the number of firms listed in Compustat has declined substantially since 2000, the number of 
large firms (e.g., those with over $1 billion in sales in 2009 $) has not. The rankings of the top firms should 
therefore not be significantly affected by the decline in total firms listed. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682745
 13 
robustness of this finding. The second row of Table 1 considers the displacement hazard for 
a firm in the top 2 within its industry and the third row considers the displacement hazard 
for a firm in the top 8. The fourth row measures the combined hazard of being displaced 
from the top 4 firms or of exiting the Compustat dataset (no longer publicly listed). The fifth 
row considers the hazard that a firm ranked 5-9 in the previous year enters the top 4 firms. 
All show a substantial change from a positive to negative trend around 2000. 
One concern about these measures regards the definition of the relevant industries. 
Broad national industrial categories, even at the 6-digit level, do not always reflect the 
product markets that would be used, say, in merger analysis. It seems, however, that the 
change in the persistence of dominance is robust to particular industry definitions. Row 6 
uses 4-digit NAICS; row 7 uses no industry definitions but looks instead at the persistence of 
firms within the top 100 of all firms in Compustat; row 8 uses Compustat industry segment 
data for multi-product firms. Top firms have remained more dominant even among groups 
of firms that compete only in some markets or not at all. 
Compustat does not include most private firms, although most dominant firms are 
publicly listed. Also, firm sales in Compustat are global sales. It might be informative to 
measure sales just within the United States, including private firms, to understand domestic 
persistence of dominance. Row 9 shows results for the NETS database using 8-digit SIC 
industries where firm sales are calculated as the sum of sales at US establishments. While the 
time period for the NETS data only begins in 1990, we find a similar break in trend. 
Finally, this change in trend is observed across sectors. Table A2 in the Appendix 
shows regression results for a variety of sectors in both Compustat and NETS data, all 
showing a similar pattern, although not always statistically significant and with breaks 
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occurring in different years. Furthermore, the pattern is similar if firms are weighted by real 
sales in the calculation of annual hazards (not shown, available on request). 
In summary, across a wide range of measures, the displacement of dominant firms 
rose from 1970 until the late 1990s. Then, somewhere around year 2000, this trend sharply 
reversed with substantial declines in the displacement rate. Displacement hazards have 
declined roughly half a percentage point per year since then. This change represents a 
substantial decline in Schumpeterian competition and implies a marked and rapid change in 
industrial structure. 
Investments in dominance 
A model of leapfrogging 
What might be behind this sharp decline? Some papers on the persistence of 
dominance have explored industry characteristics that are associated with the displacement 
of market leaders, including industry growth, industry concentration, and R&D intensity. 
However, only limited inferences can be drawn using industry level data because firm 
behavior may differ significantly—dominant firms may behave differently than their rivals 
and those differences might be key to understanding their persistence. For this reason, it is 
important to understand which specific investments by dominant firms are most associated 
with their persistence and also, possibly, which investments by smaller firms are most 
associated with the occurrence of leapfrogging. Such analysis can provide important clues as 
to the mechanisms underlying the recent decline of disruption. 
We conduct this inquiry in the context of an extended production function. Initially, 
consider a duopoly consisting of firm 1 and 2, where 1 has smaller revenue at time t – 1. We 
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assume a Cobb Douglas revenue production function with an additional term for rival’s 





0𝑘−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 
where l is log labor, k is log of beginning-of-year capital, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is firm productivity, and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is 
an error term of mean zero and independent of the right-hand side variables. The variable 
𝑘−𝑖𝑡 captures the notion that firm investments can exert an externality on other firms’ 
revenues. For example, in a classic Cournot duopoly one firm’s investment in capacity shifts 
the other firm’s demand curve. 
Allowing the firm to optimize labor in each period given capital stocks and 





1𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 
Sutton (2007) finds that the shocks to firm’s market shares are independent of each other, 
so, without significant loss of generality we can model the errors as a normal distribution, 
𝜇𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑡).13 Then the probability of a change in market leadership at time t is 
(3) 
𝑃[𝑦−𝑖𝑡 < 𝑦𝑖𝑡] = 1 − Φ (
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦−𝑖𝑡
√2𝜎𝑡
) = Φ (−




13 This assumes that both firms have the same error distribution. Allowing different variances does not 
significantly alter the specification. 
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where Φ is the standard normal distribution function. Taking a linear approximation of Φ, 
and capturing differences in 𝜎 with fixed effects for year and industry j, we get a linear 
probability model,14 
(4) 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛿𝑡 + γω𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑘−𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 . 
This equation can represent either the probability that a leader firm becomes a follower or 
the probability that a follower firm leapfrogs into leadership. When the dependent variable is 
the displacement hazard of a leading firm, we expect 𝛾, 𝛽1 < 0, 𝛽2 > 0. When the 
dependent variable is a leapfrogging probability, we expect 𝛾, 𝛽1 > 0, 𝛽2 < 0. 
Empirical implementation 
Equation (4) can be readily extended to accommodate more than two firms. To 
explore the displacement hazard of top firms, we use a sample consisting of firms ranked in 
the top four by sales the previous year. In this case, we include capital stocks, 𝑘−𝑖𝑡, for firms 
ranked 5 – 8 or an average of these. These are the firms most likely to displace the subject 
firm. To explore leapfrogging hazards, the sample consists of firm ranked 5 – 8 and we 
include capital stocks of firms ranked 1 – 4. 
Also, equation (4) can include multiple capital stocks. Our base specification includes 
tangible capital (property, plant, and equipment) and intangible capital. We also decompose 
intangible capital into a range of component stocks. 
 
14 In this specification, 𝜔−𝑖𝑡 is included in the error term, although this is not necessary. Also note that this 
specification accommodates differences in coefficients between dominant and other firms. 
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In our data the capital stocks are observed, but firm productivity is not. Obtaining 
estimates of productivity for each firm each year is important to avoid biasing the capital 
stock estimates. For example, if better managers made the firm more productive and less 
likely to be displaced and if better managers also invested relatively more in intangible 
capital, then omitting the productivity measure, will bias the coefficient for intangible capital. 
To obtain measures of productivity, we use a two-step procedure. First, we estimate 
equation (1) for the sample of all firms, obtaining firm-year productivity estimates, ?̂?𝑖𝑡. Then 
we regress equation (4) for the limited sample of subject firms (top four or second four), 
using our productivity estimates as a control variable. Because we are using an estimated 
variable in our second step, we bootstrap to obtain standard errors. 
We estimate equation (1) using log value added as the dependent variable and log 
labor, log tangible capital, and log intangible capital as the independent variables. We also 
experimented with different measures of 𝑘−𝑖𝑡, but these made little difference to the 
coefficients obtained.15  
To obtain estimates of productivity, 𝜔𝑖𝑡, independently of the error term, 𝜈𝑖𝑡, we use 
the Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015) control function method. Note that control 
function methods of estimating production functions—Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn 
and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg, Caves, and Frazer (2015)— are two step procedures that 
generate estimates of 𝜔𝑖𝑡 in their first stages. Using OLS or other techniques for estimating 
production functions, a rough measure of productivity might also be obtained by taking the 
residual of the estimated equation. However, that residual equals 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 and, since 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is 
 
15 Our base specification calculates it as the log of the sum of capital for all firms in the industry excluding the 
subject firm. While this term has a statistically significant coefficient, it made little difference in the productivity 
estimates. The correlation between productivity including it and excluding it altogether is .9974. 
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correlated with the error in our second stage regression, 𝜖𝑖𝑡, by construction, using these 
residuals will lead to biased estimates.  
To check the robustness of our estimation choice, Table A3 in the Appendix 
compares estimates of equation (4) using different productivity measures. The results differ 
little, especially across the different control function methods. 
Displacement hazard 
Table 2 shows basic estimates of (3) for the top four firms in each 6-digit NAICS 
industry in Compustat, using stocks for tangible and intangible capital and omitting the 
terms for other firms. The sample includes only firms that were in the top four last year and 
the outcome variable is 1 for those that are ranked out of the top four in the current year 
and 0 otherwise. Column 1 shows that productivity and both capital stocks are significantly 
associated with the displacement hazard. The coefficient for intangible capital is somewhat 
larger in absolute magnitude than the coefficient for tangible capital, but the difference is not 
statistically significant. To gauge the economic significance of these estimates, from 1995 to 
2017 the sample mean hazard rate declined 7.7% while the mean of log tangible capital 
increased 1.55 and the mean of log intangible capital increased 2.03. Intangible capital is 
associated with a larger contribution to declining turnover by virtue of its greater growth and 
higher coefficient.  
It is possible that the coefficient estimates might be biased for a number of reasons. 
First, independent changes in industry characteristics might affect both the dependent 
variable and firm’s decisions to invest in capital stocks. For instance, a decline in industry 
volatility might reduce displacement hazards and also provide more favorable conditions for 
firms to invest. To control for changing industry conditions, Column 2 includes separate 
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year fixed effects for each industry. With these additional controls, the coefficients are larger 
in absolute magnitude. 
Another bias might arise if firms anticipate changes in volatility in advance, investing 
or disinvesting prior to the disruption. In this case, the capital stocks might be correlated 
with the error term. Column 3 conducts an instrumental variable regression with fixed 
effects, using the five-year lags of the capital stocks as instruments. Firms are much less 
likely to anticipate changes in volatility five years in advance, so these lagged stocks should 
not be much influenced by expectations of future volatility yet they are correlated with 
subsequent capital stocks by construction.16  The coefficients are quite similar to the OLS 
estimates and the null hypothesis that the capital stocks are exogenous cannot be rejected 
(probability value of .153). 
Columns 4 and 5 repeat the regression in Column 1 over different time periods. It 
appears that after 2000 the coefficient on tangible capital fell substantially while the 
coefficient on intangible capital rose. This shift suggests that intangibles are associated with 
larger decreases in turnover after 2000, perhaps because firms received a greater payoff to 
these investments. That view is supported by the relative capital stocks of top four firms 
shown in Figure 2. Both stocks have grown substantially since the mid-1990s. But around 
2000, relative investment in intangibles grew much more rapidly, more than doubling 
intangible stocks relative to tangible capital. Both this shift in investment and the shift in 
coefficients suggests that the rise of intangibles is important in understanding the reversal in 
displacement hazards following 2000. 
 
16 The first stage regression indicates that the instrument is not weak; an F-test of the joint significance of the 
explanatory variables has a statistics of 405.6. 
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Finally, note that the decline in turnover of market leaders is not the result of 
declining volatility in markets, 𝜎𝑡. Both the variance of the residual in (1) and of productivity, 
𝜔𝑖𝑡, have been rising.17 The rising persistence of market leaders has been occurring despite a 
general increase in market turbulence. 
Externalities 
The regressions in Table 2 omit the terms in equation (3) for the capital of rival 
firms. The omitted terms might be correlated with the error term, biasing the coefficients. 
Table 3 explores interactions between the top four firms in each industry with the second 
four firms, those ranked 5 – 8. Column 1 adds the capital stocks of the second-tier firms to 
the regression in Table 2, column 1. The coefficients for the subject firm are indeed larger. 
But neither the second-tier firms’ investments in tangible capital or intangible capital appear 
to have a significant effect on the top tier firms. Also, the joint probabilities that second-tier 
firms’ investments affect the displacement hazard of the top firms (the bottom two rows of 
the table) are not significant. 
The second column of Table 3 shows the corresponding regression for the second-
tier firms. The dependent variable is now the probability that a firm that was ranked 5 – 8 
last year leapfrogs into the top four firms. Here, the investments made by the top four firms 
significantly affect the leapfrog probability, both individually and jointly. The tangible capital 
investments of the third and fourth ranked firms reduces the leapfrog probability. In effect, 
 
17 The variance of the change in 𝜔𝑖𝑡 rises from .083 up through 2000 to .117 after 2000; the variance in the 
change in the total residual rises from .092 to .124.  
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these investments increase the revenues of the third and fourth ranked firms and thus raise 
the hurdle that second-tier firms need to overcome.  
The pattern for investments made by the top four firms in intangibles, however, 
exhibits a markedly different pattern. Here, it is the largest firm’s investment that has the 
biggest coefficient. This suggests that intangibles play a different role—they don’t so much 
raise the hurdle to leapfrogging as they depress the relative revenues of second-tier firms. 
That is, to the extent that intangibles raise the hurdle that second tier firms need to 
overcome, that effect should mostly appear in the coefficients of the fourth and third ranked 
firms, the firms that are most at risk of being leapfrogged. The large coefficient for the 
biggest firm suggests that the role of intangibles may be in the negative externality these 
investments exert on smaller firms rather than their role in raising firm revenues and thus 
raising the leapfrogging hurdle. Recall that in equation (1), investments play a dual role: they 
raise the revenue of the subject firm and they also exert a negative externality on demand for 
other firms. Intangibles may play a role in “business stealing.” Given the dramatic shift 
towards intangible investment by the top four firms seen in Figure 2, these externalities may 
represent important “barriers to mobility” that appear to play a major role in the decline in 
displacement and leapfrogging.  
Decomposing intangibles 
Which specific intangibles are involved in these interactions? It is interesting to 
decompose the aggregate firm intangible stocks into components. To explore the relative 
influence of different types of intangibles, it is helpful to simplify the regression in Table 3, 
column 2. Specifically, we aggregate the intangible stocks of the top four firms and only 
include the tangible stocks of the firms ranked third and fourth the previous year since these 
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are the stocks that significantly affect leapfrogging. A likelihood ratio test does not reject 
these restrictions (probability value of .703).18 
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the components of Peters and Taylor’s (2016) intangible 
capital: a stock of R&D investments, a stock of organizational capital (derived from Sales, 
General, and Administrative expenditures), and balance sheet intangibles, which consist 
substantially of goodwill accumulated from firm mergers and acquisitions. Organizational 
capital and other intangibles are important for the subject firm’s probability of leapfrogging. 
Of the investments made by top four firms, only investments in organizational capital are 
economically and statistically significant.19  
Organizational capital includes spending on advertising and marketing, lobbying, and 
software development where software is not part of the product. Columns 2 – 4 include 
measures of specific intangible stocks including software, acquisitions, advertising and 
marketing, lobbying expenditures, and patents. Because we want to focus on organizational 
capital, columns 2 and 3 exclude industries where software is a major part of the product.20 
This restriction isolates the general effect of own-developed software on competition across 
all sectors, aside from the role that software plays as a cost of goods sold. These regressions 
cover 1991 – 2012 because of data limitations. Column 4 includes all industries, but only 
 
18 To minimize problems of firms with missing or zero stocks, we use the logs of average stocks of the top four 
firms rather than the sum of individual log stocks in Table 4. 
19 When the regression is run using just the organizational capital of the largest firm in each industry, the 
coefficient on organizational capital is highly significant, -.016 (.006). 
20 These industries are NAICS 5112, software publishers, 5181, Internet service providers and web search 
portals, 5182, Data Processing, Hosting, and Related Services, 5191 Other information services, 5415 
Computer Systems Design and Related Services, 3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing, 
3342 Communications Equipment Manufacturing, 3344 Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component 
Manufacturing, and 3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing. 
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years 1999 – 2014 when lobbying data are available. Of the detailed investments made by top 
firms, only software and patent stocks have statistically significant coefficients, both for the 
subject firm and for the investments of top-four firms.  
The importance of information technology is also seen in Figure 3. Top four firms 
dramatically increased their software investments since around 2000 compared to the other 
intangible stocks.21 This difference is seen both in the level capital stocks for the top four 
firms (top panel) and also in the stocks of top four firms compared to the second-tier firms 
ranked 5-8 (bottom panel). To estimate the combined impact of the growth in software 
capital, multiply the change in the log software capital stock in Figure 3 (about 2) times the 
coefficient of top firm software from column 3 (-.014) to get a reduction in the leapfrog 
probability of about 2.5 – 3 percent (2 x -.014). Looking at the decline in the aggregate 
leapfrog hazard in Figure 1B, the increase in software investment by top four firms accounts 
for most of it. Software spending by dominant firms might present a substantial barrier to 
mobility. 
Some researchers have suggested that a decline in competition has resulted from 
mergers and acquisitions that have been permitted by overly lax antitrust enforcement 
(Grullon et al. 2019). Acquisitions do not appear to play much role in the increased 
persistence of market-leading firms. Figure 3 shows that the stock of acquisitions by top 
firms remained flat since 2000. Figure 4 shows the mean acquisitions per year for top four 
firms. These have declined since the late 1990s, making it difficult to attribute a decline in 
competition to excessive acquisitions since then.  
 
21 The software line in the figure also excludes industries where software is a major part of the product. 
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Different types of software investment 
The software stock measure used above is built from employment flows of software 
developers. These flows represent firm investment in developing their own software. Firms 
also purchase software services (custom programming) and pre-packaged software. We can 
look at the relative roles of different types of software investment in the US using data from 
the Census ACES survey and also using industry level data from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA). The industry level data also permit us to perform instrumental variable 
estimation.  
[ACES results are awaiting Census disclosure] 
The BEA provides a longer time series on software investments at the industry level. 
We calculate annual displacement hazards from the NETS data aggregated to BEA industry 
classifications for the US from 1990 through 2014. Since software investment is dominated 
by the largest firms in each industry,22 we use the share of software capital in total capital as 
an independent variable. We scale other capital stocks similarly. Table 5 reports regression 
results the annual displacement hazard using all software (column 1) and different types of 
software (column 2), both with controls for stocks of equipment and structures as well. All 
regressions have industry and year fixed effects, they are weighted by the number of firms in 
each industry to reduce heteroscedasticity arising from sampling variance,23 and standard 
 
22 Using CPS data from 2000-2014, 38% of software developers work at firms with more than 1000 employees. 
The ACES data show that the largest firms spend dramatically more on own-account software in proportion to 
their total investments. 
23 The number of firms per industry vary by two orders of magnitude, creating substantial differences in 
sampling variance. 
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errors are clustered by industry. Software in general and own-account software in particular 
have significant negative coefficients. 
Some scholars suggest that competition has declined in the US relative to Europe 
because of lax antitrust enforcement or corporate lobbying.24 Perhaps software investment 
endogenously responds to these exogenous changes in competition, creating a spurious 
correlation. To correct for possible endogeneity, columns 3 and 4 report an instrumental 
variable estimation. We instrument the software share (column 3) and the own-account 
software share (column 4) using the software share of capital for European countries 
obtained from the EU KLEMS database. Since European businesses likely respond to 
similar technological opportunities as do US businesses, software investment should exhibit 
similar variation across industries.25 But European software investment is plausibly 
independent of factors that might influence the displacement of leaders in US markets. The 
IV regression coefficients have the same signs, are larger in magnitude, but are less precise.26  
Thus, both at the firm and industry levels, the rate of displacement of dominant 
firms is negatively related to investments in own-account software and this relationship 
appears to be independent of US political economic factors. 
 
24 Grullon et al. (2019); Philippon (2019). 
25 Our first stage regressions are highly significant. 
26 The first stage regression indicates that the instrument is not weak with an F-test of joint significance of the 
explanatory variables of 705.1. An overidentification test for covariate balance cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the covariates are balanced (χ2=4.386; p<0.986). 
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Discussion: Why software? 
Large firm investments in all types of intangibles have risen since 2000. But 
investment in software has risen dramatically more in proportion, software investment by 
top four firms has risen sharply even relative to large second-tier firms, and software 
investments by top firms appear to play a unique role in suppressing leapfrogging by second-
tier firms. Moreover, the reversal in trend of the displacement hazard occurred just as 
investment in software by top four firms surged starting in the late 1990s. Of course, other 
developments affected some industries around this time, such as the China Shock and the 
dotcom bubble, but both the decline in displacement hazards and the surge in software 
investment happened across all sectors, not just those directly affected by China trade or 
dotcom firms. The decline of Schumpeterian competition appears to be more than a general 
story just about the rise of intangibles. Both large and small firms in many industries now 
invest more in intangibles generally, but information technology appears to play a particular 
asymmetric role, advantaging large firms at the expense of smaller ones. It is helpful to 
speculate why this might be. 
To get a sense of why software might have a similar impact on competition across a 
wide range of industries, it is helpful to look at some examples. Many of the large IT systems 
used by dominant firms share a common purpose: they allow firms to improve the quality of 
products and services by managing complexity. Consider: 
• Retailers such as Amazon and Walmart are able to use logistics and inventory 
management systems to offer customers much greater selection and to 
respond to demand changes much more rapidly despite the larger number of 
items for sale. 
• Large manufacturers are able to design products such as airplanes and 
automobiles with many more features using expensive custom CAD/CAM 
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systems and software components. Modern cars have over 100 computers 
and over 100 million lines of software code. 
• Using large amounts of data, online platform advertising companies like 
Google and Facebook are able to target prospective consumers with highly 
tailored ads, delivering better quality to advertisers. 
• Financial institutions use large software systems to similarly target credit 
offers, managing both marketing and risk. 
All of these systems in diverse industries allow market leaders to manage a higher degree of 
complexity than their rivals, thus delivering better quality products and services. 
Why might complex systems provide greater advantage to dominant firms? Some 
researchers, such as Bauer and Lashkari (2018) find evidence of economies of scale in the 
use of IT.27 Software has large fixed costs and low marginal cost, giving an advantage to 
those firms who use it more widely.  
However, economies of scale are nothing new. Other technologies exhibit well-
known scale economies, such as steelmaking or electric power generation. Nor is it clear why 
second-tier firms cannot also realize scale advantages from software, as they do in the steel 
and electricity industries. There is a critical difference. Steel and electricity generation derive 
size advantages because of exogenous factors related to the physics of heat generation. In 
contrast, the advantages brought by the systems in the above examples derive from their 
ability to improve quality and to thereby differentiate the firm from its rivals. The advantages 
of these large software systems derive not from absolute size but from an advantage relative 
to the size rivals’ systems. Firms endogenously choose the scale of complexity they manage 
relative to rivals.  
 
27 Aghion et al. (2019) and de Ridder (2019) provide growth models featuring IT scale economies. 
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In other words, investments in these large software systems appear to be 
endogenous sunk costs as described by (Sutton 1991).28 Sutton argues that leading firms in 
vertically differentiated markets can sink large investments in advertising or R&D to improve 
product quality and thereby achieve a large stable market share, creating a “natural 
oligopoly.” In equilibrium, firms invest at different levels, they differ in quality and in the 
prices they charge. Effectively, the quality investments made by leading firms increase the 
revenue gap to follower firms, decreasing the likelihood of leapfrogging. Large investments 
in own-account software can also differentiate firms by quality, perhaps at a larger scale. For 
example, Ellickson (2007) shows evidence that supermarket distribution systems create a 
Sutton-type market structure. Technology that provides greater differentiation at scale 
generates industry structures very different from technologies that generate exogenous cost 
savings at scale.  
These endogenous scale economies provide a succinct explanation for the observed 
trends. The emergence of IT systems to manage highly complex environments in the 1990s 
might have created new opportunities for firms to compete via large sunk investments in 
software, leading to a growing gap between first and second-tier firms and hence declining 
displacement.  
Other factors may amplify these trends. To the extent that implementation of these 
systems depends on particularly skilled managers and/or software developers, some firms 
may have unique advantages. Bloom et al. (2012) find that firms with US managers have a 
distinct advantage at implementing IT systems. To the extent that these systems depend on 
complementary organizations and are tailored to specific organizations, some firms will have 
 
28 See also Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983, 1987). 
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greater benefit than others and these advantages will not easily diffuse. Also, some of the 
knowledge needed to implement these systems may be blockaded from rivals by intellectual 
property restrictions or other means. Andrews et al. (2016) suggest that the diffusion of new 
knowledge has slowed (see also Akcigit and Ates 2019). This interpretation is bolstered by 
evidence that dominant firm patent stocks have a modest negative impact on leapfrogging 
(Table 4). 
Markups and Industry Concentration 
Economists sometimes speak as if there were a unitary level of competition for each 
industry. As we noted in the introduction, price competition might be different from or even 
counter to technological or Schumpeterian competition. In this section, we explore how firm 
markups and industry concentration—generally taken as measures of competition—relate to 
our measure of industry leadership displacement, a measure of Schumpeterian competition. 
We calculate firm markups using the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 
(2020) with Compustat data (see Appendix). Figure 5 shows a binned scatterplot of the 
mean displacement hazard for top-four firms in each industry-year plotted against the mean 
lagged markup of firms in the industry, after controlling for year fixed effects. The plot 
shows a modestly upward sloping relationship except at the tails. Table A4 on the Appendix 
reports a series of regressions along the lines of Table 2, adding the firm markup lagged one 
year. Markups have a significant positive relationship with the displacement of leader firms 
across all sectors.  
To study industry concentration, we calculate the top four firms’ share of sales in 8-
digit SIC industries using NETS data for national industries. Figure 6A shows a tight 
negative relationship between industry concentration and the displacement hazard for top 
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four firms. Figure 6B shows the displacement hazard declining with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index until the index reaches a value of about 0.25, corresponding to the 
threshold for what the Department of Justice considers “highly concentrated.” Regressions 
of the displacement hazard against interactions of industry concentration (see Appendix 
Table A5) show a highly significant negative relationship with little difference across industry 
sectors and with an increase in magnitude after the year 2000. In these data, industry 
concentration rose modestly after 2000, corresponding to the parallel decline in displacement 
hazards.29 These correlations suggest that rising industry concentration might reflect the 
same factors driving a decline in Schumpeterian competition. This association is bolstered by 
evidence that the increase in industry concentration at the national level is substantially 
driven by the increase in proprietary software spending (Bessen 2020). And it is consistent 
with the view that growing endogenous sunk software costs might lead to both higher 
concentration and greater persistence of dominant firms (Shaked and Sutton, 1982, 1983, 
1987). On the other hand, it appears that industry concentration has been rising since well 
before 2000 (Autor et al. 2020). Also, note that falling industrial concentration at the local 
level has accompanied rising concentration at the national level.30 
Conclusion 
Using multiple measures of the turnover of dominant firms, we find evidence of a 
substantial and abrupt change in the nature of competition across most sectors of the US 
 
29 Using a balanced panel, mean unweighted four-firm industry concentration rose from 72.6% in 2990 to 
73.3% in 2014; weighted by industry sales, four-firm concentration rose from 75.2% to 79.4%. 
30 Rinz (2018), Hsieh and Rossi-Hansberg (2019). 
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economy beginning in the late 1990s. Schumpeterian competition rose substantially over 
previous decades but dropped sharply in a relatively short time since the late 1990s. 
This pattern seems quite distinct from the evolution of markups and industry 
concentration which have grown steadily since about 1980 (De Loecker, Eeckhout, and 
Unger 2020, Autor et al. 2020). Our analysis suggests that these metrics capture different 
things. In particular, markups are perhaps a better measure of static price competition than 
they are of dynamic technological competition. We find, in fact, that higher markups are 
associated with greater industrial dynamism reflected by the displacement of industry leaders.  
Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between displacement rates of dominant 
firms and a wide array of investments they make, including investments in intangibles, R&D, 
organizational capital, acquisitions, software, advertising, and lobbying expenditures. 
Contrary to a view that attributes declining competition to lax antitrust merger enforcement 
(Grullon et al. 2017), we find that acquisitions by top firms are not significantly associated 
with decreased leapfrogging and, in any case, top firms have reduced the number of 
acquisitions they make each year since 2000. Nor do we find a substantial role for corporate 
lobbying by top firms (Gutierrez and Philippon 2017).  
Instead, the evidence is most consistent with an explanation that emphasizes the role 
of proprietary software. We find that software stocks are significantly related to lower 
displacement rates across a variety of datasets and measures. Moreover, investments by large 
firms in self-developed software increased by an order of magnitude beginning in the late 
1990s. This surge can account for most of the decline in leapfrogging rates and an 
instrumental variable analysis suggests the relationship is causal. Viewing these investments 
as endogenous sunk costs (Sutton 1991) provides a parsimonious explanation for the decline 
in Schumpeterian competition. Enabled by new technology, leading firms made large 
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investments in managing complexity to improve the quality of their products and services, 
differentiating themselves from rivals and creating a “natural oligopoly.” 
Thus, it seems that technology has begun to play a new and different role in the 
economy. New technologies have been generally associated with increased disruption of 
industries and technology continues to disrupt industries and business models in general 
(newspapers, music). But now, it seems, information technology allows dominant firms to 
suppress their own “creative destruction,” decreasing disruption in this particular dimension.  
The social welfare implications might be ambiguous: while dominant firms use 
information technology to improve the quality of their products and services (more features, 
greater selection, greater targeting), these firms might use technology to differentiate their 
products excessively with an eye toward “business stealing.” Moreover, while this technology 
may deliver productivity benefits today, it is not clear that it will diffuse through the rest of 
the economy or that future innovators will face restrictions to their growth.  
The decline in displacement hazards is not a conventional antitrust problem and it 
will not likely be best addressed by simply reinvigorating conventional antitrust policy. This 
paper provides methods to measure and analyze changes in displacement hazards, providing 
tools for future research on how the persistence of dominant firms affects innovation and 
productivity growth and what that means for policy. 
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Tables and Figures 





year Trend (𝛼) Change in trend (𝛽) 
Compustat data       




2000 0.0017 (0.0004)*** -0.0046 (0.0009)*** 




2000 0.0027 (0.0005)*** -0.0062 (0.0010)*** 




2000 0.0010 (0.0004)** -0.0032 (0.0007)*** 
Displacement from top 
4 firms + Exit 
6-digit NAICS 
primary industry 
2000 0.0024 (0.0004)*** -0.0061 (0.0010)*** 
Leapfrog into top 4 
firms (rank 5-9) 
6-digit NAICS 
primary industry 
2001 0.0013 (0.0002)*** -0.0029 (0.0007)*** 




2000 0.0022 (0.0003)*** -0.0055 (0.0008)*** 
Displacement from top 
100 firms All industries 
2003 0.0014 (0.0004)*** -0.0048 (0.0013)*** 
Displacement from top 
4 firm segments 
4-digit SIC industry 
segments 
1998 0.0012 (0.0011) -0.0047 (0.0019)** 
NETS data  
     




1997 0.0057 (0.0028)* -0.0079 (0.0033)** 
              
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Break years are estimated using the 
supremum Wald test. The trend and change in trend after the break are determined from a simple OLS 
regression of the annual hazard rates on these two terms (see text). 
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Table 2. Displacement Hazard and Tangible/Intangible Capital 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Base Ind-year FE IV <=2000 >2000 
 1976-2017 1976-2017 1980-2017 1976-2000 2001-2017 
Productivity -0.019 -0.066** -0.099*** -0.102*** -0.032 
 (0.018) (0.028) (0.009) (0.031) (0.023) 
      
Net PPE -0.029*** -0.037*** -0.027*** -0.043*** -0.023*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
      
Intangibles -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.032*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
      
Industry FE x  x x x 
Year FE x  x x x 
Industry x year FE  x    
      
Observations 26471 26471 22159 15936 10535 
Adjusted R-squared 0.091 0.067 0.077 0.109 0.091 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Independent variables are in logs. Productivity is estimated by  the ACF method. Column 3 instruments 
capital stocks using 5-year lagged values.  
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3682745
 39 
Table 3. Hazard estimates with external interactions 
    
Hazard: 
Top 4 firm 
moves down  
Second 4 firm 
moves up 
Subject firm    
Productivity -0.006  0.090*** 
 (0.021)  (0.022) 
Net PPE -0.033***  0.039*** 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Intangibles -0.035***  0.032*** 
 (0.004)  (0.003) 
Tangible Capital   
Firm 5 0.004 Firm 1 -0.001 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Firm 6 0.001 Firm 2 -0.002 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Firm 7 -0.001 Firm 3 -0.011*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Firm 8 -0.002 Firm 4 -0.014*** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Intangible Capital   
Firm 5 -0.001 Firm 1 -0.014*** 
 (0.002)  (0.004) 
Firm 6 0.003 Firm 2 -0.004 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Firm 7 0.002 Firm 3 -0.005 
 (0.003)  (0.005) 
Firm 8 0.004 Firm 4 -0.006 
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
    
Observations 14924  13765 
R-squared 0.118  0.087 
Other firms (probability values) 
Joint test of 
tangibles  
.261  .000 
Joint test of 
intangibles  
.164  .000 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by firm, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. All 
regressions have industry and year fixed effects. Independent variables are in logs. Productivity is 
estimated using the ACF method. 
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Table 4. Decomposing Intangibles, Leapfrog hazard 
Subject firm 1 2 3 4 
Productivity 0.093*** 0.085*** 0.056*** 0.105*** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.017) (0.035) 
Net PPE 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.052***  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
R&D 0.001                 
(0.002)                
Org. capital 0.022***                 
(0.004)                
Other intangibles 0.002*                 
(0.001)                
Software Stock  0.003 0.008   
 (0.004) (0.005)  
Acquisitions  0.009  0.012  
 (0.006)  (0.009) 
Advertising  0.006**  0.002  
 (0.003)  (0.004) 
Patents    0.012*** 
    (0.004) 
Lobbying    -0.006  
   (0.014) 
Top 4 firms (average)    
PPE, firm #3 -0.016*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.008  
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
PPE, firm #4 -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.018***  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
R&D -0.003                 
(0.003)                
Org. capital -0.015***                 
(0.006)                
Other intangibles 0.001                 
(0.002)                
Software Stock  -0.014** -0.014**   
 (0.007) (0.006)  
Acquisitions  0.002  -0.003  
 (0.007)  (0.012) 
Advertising  0.003*  0.002  
 (0.002)  (0.002) 
Patents    0.009  
   (0.007) 
Lobbying    -0.012**  
   (0.006) 
Observations 12964 7706 9140 4088 
R-squared 0.086 0.118 0.106 0.133 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Industry 
and year fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 exclude industries where software is a major part of the product. 
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Table 5. Displacement hazard at industry level, US  
Dependent variable: Displacement of top four firm ranked by sales in US market 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS IV IV 
All software share -0.412***   -0.911***   
  (0.120)   (0.219)   
Own-account software share   -0.669**   -2.850*  
  (0.324)   (1.545) 
Prepackaged software share   -0.595   0.455  
  (0.640)   (2.404) 
Custom software share   -0.127   0.283  
  (0.272)   (0.501) 
All equipment share -0.097 -0.070 -0.235*** -0.158  
(0.076) (0.097) (0.083) (0.106) 
All structures share 0.072 0.093 0.044 0.110  




    
Observations 1,440 1,440 1,440 1,440 
R-squared 0.373 0.374     
Note: Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. All regressions 
have industry and year fixed effects and industries are weighted by firm counts. Independent variables are 
in logs. Software share (column 3) and own-account share (column 4) are instrumented using the log 
software share of capital for European countries. First stage regressions are highly significant. 
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Figure 1. Displacement Hazards 
 
 
Note: Break years are estimated using the supremum Wald test. The trend and change in trend after the 
break are determined from a simple OLS regression of the annual hazard rates on these two terms. 
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Figure 3. Trends in Intangible Stocks of Top Four Firms 
A. Levels, Top four firms 
 
 
B. Difference, top four firms relative to firms ranked 5-9 
 
Note: software line excludes firms in industries where software is a major part of the product. 
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Figure 5. Mean Industry Displacement Hazard and Markups 
 
Note: Binned scatter plot from Compustat data 1980-2014, showing mean annual 
displacement hazard for 6-digit NAICS industries after controlling for year plotted against 
mean industry markup, calculated by the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 2020. 
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Figure 6. Mean Industry Displacement Hazard and Industry Concentration 
A. Four-firm share of sales, NETS data 
 
B. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, Sales 
 
Note: Binned scatter plot from NETS data 1990-2014, showing mean annual displacement 
hazard for 8-digit SIC industries after controlling for year plotted against industry 
concentration measures. 
 





Table A1. Mean Log Values, Year 2000 
 
Firm rank 
1 – 4  
Firm rank 
5 - 8 
Net Property, Plant, and Equipment 5.37 4.33 
Intangibles 5.63 4.76 
R&D 0.74 0.34 
Organizational Capital 4.63 3.78 
Balance Sheet Intangibles 2.83 1.71 
software Stock 1.07 0.59 
Patent Stock 1.26 0.86 
Acquisition Stock 1.03 0.82 
Advertising/Marketing Stock 1.02 0.66 
Lobbying Stock 0.16 0.07 
Markup 1.35 1.37 
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Sector displacement hazards 
Table A2. Displacement Hazard from Top 4 Firms, Best-fit trend with single break 
Data Break year Trend (𝛼) Change in trend (𝛽) 
Compustat Sector, (6-digit NAICS industries) 
     
Nondurable mfg. 2000 0.0017 (0.0008)** -0.0052 (0.0016)*** 
Durable mfg. 1997 0.0032 (0.0007)*** -0.0059 (0.0011)*** 
Transport, utilities 2003 0.0012 (0.0009) -0.0059 (0.0021)*** 
Trade, services 1998 0.0017 (0.0009)* -0.0052 (0.0015)*** 
Finance 1999 0.0029 (0.0014)** -0.0046 (0.0026)* 
 
NETS Sector (8-digit SIC industries    
Farms 2007 0.0014 (0.0010) -0.0068 (0.0034)* 
Oil and gas extraction 2007 0.0010 (0.0020) -0.0116 (0.0066)* 
Mining, except oil and gas 1998 0.0019 (0.0020) -0.0056 (0.0026)** 
Support activities for mining 2000 0.0033 (0.0029) -0.0063 (0.0041) 
Construction 2002 0.0001 (0.0011) -0.0022 (0.0019) 
Transportation equipment 1998 0.0051 (0.0042) -0.0084 (0.0053) 
Retail trade 1995 0.0064 (0.0026)** -0.0080 (0.0028)*** 
Broadcasting and telecommunications 2005 0.0031 (0.0014)** -0.0084 (0.0035)** 
Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 2001 0.0035 (0.0021)* -0.0069 (0.0033)** 
Real estate 1997 0.0010 (0.0045) -0.0040 (0.0054) 
Management of companies and enterprises - 
Administrative and support services 
2000 0.0015 (0.0019) -0.0035 (0.0027) 
Waste management and remediation services 2005 0.0004 (0.0015) -0.0060 (0.0041) 
Ambulatory health care services 1996 0.0055 (0.0049) -0.0084 (0.0056) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Break years are estimated using the 
supremum Wald test. The trend and change in trend after the break are determined from a simple OLS 
regression of the annual hazard rates on these two terms (see text). 
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Different production function estimations 
 








Petrin Olley, Pakes    
      
Net PPE -0.0366*** -0.0302*** -0.0253*** -0.0280*** -0.0284*** 
 (0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
      
Intangibles -0.0152*** -0.0262*** -0.0295*** -0.0273*** -0.0268*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0028) 
      
Productivity -0.0143*** -0.0945*** -0.0915*** -0.0889*** -0.0784*** 
 (0.0039) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0089) 
      
Observations 29571 27097 27097 27097 26996 
Adj. R-squared 0.082 0.093 0.091 0.091 0.087 
Note: Dependent variable is displacement from top 4 firms ranked by sales. Standard errors clustered by 
firm in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Includes industry and year fixed effects. Independent 
variables are in logs. 
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Markups and Industry Concentration 
Table A4. Displacement Hazards and Markups 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Net PPE -0.0494*** -0.0454*** -0.0494*** -0.0494*** -0.0497*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Intangibles -0.0066*** -0.0070*** -0.0066*** -0.0067*** -0.0062*** 
 (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Lagged markup 0.0905***  0.0935*** 0.0898***  
 (0.0112)  (0.0175) (0.0112)  
Lag 5 markup  0.0678***    
  (0.0117)    
L.markup x after 2000   -0.0046   
   (0.0183)   
L.markup x High R&D    0.0039  
    (0.0047)  
Lag markup x sector      
Nondurable mfg.     0.0999*** 
     (0.0188) 
Durable mfg.     0.1136*** 
     (0.0140) 
Transportation, utilities     0.0872*** 
     (0.0250) 
Wholesale, retail     0.0996*** 
     (0.0227) 
Finance      0.0610*** 
     (0.0114) 
Services     0.1050*** 
     (0.0116) 
Other     0.1334*** 
     (0.0201) 
      
Observations 30189 25603 30189 30189 30189 
R-squared 0.112 0.108 0.112 0.112 0.113 
Note: Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Industry and year 
fixed effects. Markups are calculated by the method of De Loecker, Eeckhout, and Unger 2020. 
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Table A5. Displacement Hazards and Industry Four-firm Concentration Ratio 
 1 2 3 
Concentration Ratio -0.1284*** -0.1196***              
 (0.0015) (0.0017)              
After 2000 x concentration  -0.0149***              
  (0.0008)              
Sector x concentration    
Mining, construction   -0.1262*** 
   (0.0023) 
Non-durable manufacturing   -0.1297*** 
   (0.0017) 
Durable manufacturing   -0.1282*** 
   (0.0017) 
Transportation, utilities   -0.1292*** 
   (0.0027) 
Trade   -0.1306*** 
   (0.0017) 
Finance   -0.1278*** 
   (0.0030) 
Services   -0.1260*** 
   (0.0018) 
Other   -0.1196*** 
   (0.0078) 
    
Observations               151,896                151,896                151,896  
R-squared 0.063 0.050 0.063 
Note: Standard errors clustered by industry in parentheses, * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Industry and year fixed effects. Concentration is industry share of revenues of the top 4 
firms in NETS 8-digit SIC industries.  
 
  




De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) assume a revenue production function, 
(A1) 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑡 is log deflated revenues for firm i at time t, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is log deflated cost of goods sold, 
𝑘𝑖𝑡 is log deflated capital, 𝜔𝑖𝑡 is unobserved productivity, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is an error term capturing 
unanticipated shocks and measurement error. They further assume an AR(1) process so that 
(A2) 
𝜔𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝜔𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜉𝑖𝑡 . 
They use a two-stage estimation, first regressing 
(A3) 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡 + ℎ(𝑣𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖𝑡  
where ℎ(𝑣𝑖𝑡 , 𝑘𝑖𝑡) is a non-parametric polynomial (we use a quadratic form). This regression 
gives us an estimate of predicted output, ?̂?𝑖𝑡, purged of unanticipated shocks and 
measurement error. We can then define 
(A4) 
?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌) ≡ (?̂?𝑖𝑡 − 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡) − 𝜌(?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑘𝑖𝑡−1).  
Following De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) then have moment conditions 
(A5) 
𝐸 [?̂?𝑖𝑡(𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌) (
𝑣𝑖𝑡−1
𝑘𝑖𝑡−1
)] = 0. 





where 𝜖?̂?𝑡 is the residual from (A3). 
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